

Modeling the Life Cycle Cost Risks in Protecting US Commercial Aircraft



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Preface

- This briefing focuses on the process used by Summit Engineering Group to develop the Life Cycle Cost (LCC) estimate for the Counter-MANPADS (CM) Program managed by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
- Risks addressed are those due to the completeness and accuracy of the LCC estimate

The Risk of Any Specific Threat is NOT Addressed Here

Acronyms

- A/C = Aircraft
- CM = Counter-MANPADS & Countermeasures
- DHS = Department of Homeland Security
- DIRCM = Directed Infrared Countermeasures
- DT&E = Developmental Test and Evaluation
- ECP = Engineering Change Proposal
- LCC = Life Cycle Cost
- LOE = Level of Effort
- LRU = Line Replicable Unit
- MFHBF = Mean Flight Hours Between Failure
- NB = Narrow Body
- O&S = Operations and Support
- OEM = Original Equipment Manufacturer
- OGC = Other Government Costs
- OT&E = Operational Test and Evaluation
- P³I = Pre-Planned Product Improvement
- PM = Program Management
- PMP = Prime Mission Product
- RDT&E = Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation
- SE = System Engineering
- ST&E = System Test and Evaluation
- STC = Supplemental Type Certificate
- T₁ = First Unit
- WB = Wide Body

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Discussion Topics

- Background
- LCC Estimate
 - Goals
 - Risks
 - Risk Mitigation
- Key Assumptions
- LCC Estimate
 - Summary
 - RDT&E Phase
 - Production & Deployment Phase
 - Operations & Support (O&S) Phase
 - De-Modification & Disposal Phase
- Risk Insights
- Related Activities
- Questions

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Background

- DHS Science and Technology (S&T) Directorate tasked with demonstrating the technical feasibility, assessing life cycle costs, and evaluating the effectiveness of protecting commercial aircraft against the threat of Man-Portable Air Defense Systems (MANPADS)
- Primarily focused on mature Directed Infrared Countermeasure (DIRCM) systems
 - Self-contained pod
 - Distributed installation
- Complex problem due to
 - Multitude of aircraft types (Wide-body vs. Narrow-body)
 - Varying flight profiles as a function of aircraft type
 - Multiple operating environments (Cargo vs. Passenger)
 - Potentially large lost revenue costs for installations that fall outside normal maintenance cycles

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Aircraft Demographics

- Wide body (WB)
 - Multi-aisle
 - Longer flights at altitude
 - More passengers per aircraft
- Narrow body (NB)
 - Single-aisle
 - Shorter, more frequent flights
 - Fewer passengers per aircraft, but higher total passenger volume
- Cargo is ~1,000 of total

| Aircraft | Type | Fleet Size* |
|---------------|----------------|--------------|
| 777 | WB | 122 |
| 767 | WB | 334 |
| 747 | WB | 108 |
| DC/MD10 | WB | 99 |
| MD11 | WB | 74 |
| A300 | WB | 140 |
| A310 | WB | 64 |
| A330 | WB | 29 |
| A318/19 | NB | 279 |
| A320/21 | NB | 368 |
| 717/727 | NB | 271 |
| 737 | NB | 1241 |
| 757 | NB | 617 |
| DC8,9/MD80/90 | NB | 703 |
| | Total** | 4,449 |

* Circa 2005 ** Excludes ~1,600 regional jets

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
LCC Estimate Goals

- Comprehensive accounting of all foreseeable costs
- Explicitly address key LCC parameters
 - STCs and follow-on P3I/testing
 - Production rate tooling/test equipment (& for depot)
 - Investments to achieve reliability growth
 - CM system weight/drag impacts to fuel consumption
- Consistent approaches among vendors' LCC estimates so individual results could be leveraged
- Exercise LCC across various quantity profiles

The goal was an independent, vendor-neutral Cost Estimate at about the 70% confidence level

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Civil Counter-MANPADS Cost Elements



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LCC Estimate Risks

- Inaccurate assumptions
- Vendor optimism
 - Initial system reliability and reliability growth
 - Learning curves
 - Flight duration across various aircraft types
- Uncertain policies
 - Export controls
 - Ground notification requirements
 - Alarm response
- Deployment timeframe

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LCC Estimate Risk Mitigation

Summit Engineering Group role was to ...

- Develop comprehensive Cost Ground Rules and Assumptions
 - Promulgated and updated at each major program milestone
- Interface with major air carriers to discuss and socialize program assumptions
- Conduct intensive research into US commercial flight demographics
- Interface with vendors on developing detailed Manufacturing Rate Assessments

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Key Assumptions

- Quantity of CM Systems and Aircraft Modified
- Production start & initial deployment in FY08
- 20-year service life
- 2-level maintenance (Airport and OEM/Depot)
- Flights demographics
 - 350 Days per Year
 - Narrow body (NB), ~5 flights/ day, ~2.3 hours/ flight
 - Wide body (WB), ~2 flights/ day, ~6.8 hours/ flight
- \$2.00/gallon (BY03) applied to CM system induced fuel consumption
- >525 A-kit installs/ year could a ‘special visit’ penalty

LCC Estimate – Summary

| LCC Phase | % of Total Cost |
|----------------------------|-----------------|
| 1. RDT&E | 1.5% |
| 2. Production & Deployment | 23.4% |
| 3. O&S | 73.9% |
| 4. De-Mod & Disposal | 1.1% |
| Total | 100.0% |

Large Cost Drivers



- RDT&E – FY08 to FY18
- Production & Deployment – FY08 to FY17
- O&S – FY08 to FY34
- De-mod & Disposal – FY27 to FY35

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LCC Estimate – RDT&E Phase

| WBS Element | Phase% | LCC% |
|-----------------|--------|------|
| 1.1 PMP | 17.4% | 0.3% |
| 1.2 A/C Integr | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| 1.3 Grd Sys Imp | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| 1.4 ST&E | 56.2% | 0.8% |
| 1.5 SE/PM | 14.9% | 0.2% |
| 1.6 Support | 1.1% | 0.0% |
| 1.7 Data | 1.1% | 0.0% |
| 1.8 ECP | 4.5% | 0.1% |
| 1.9 OGC | 4.8% | 0.1% |
| Total | 100.0% | 1.5% |

- 73.6% of Total RDT&E \$ is for PMP and ST&E (shaded areas)
- Prime Mission Product (PMP)
 - ~LOE/Yr for Block Design Upgrades
- System Test & Evaluation (ST&E)
 - Periodic DT&E/OT&E to Support PMP block upgrades
 - LOE/Test Cycle & Test Materials
 - New/Amendment STCs each vendor
 - X quantity New STC
 - Y quantity Amendment STC

Strongest Influences or Highest Risk

- PMP – Extent of future design updates
- ST&E – # and Extent of STCs

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LCC Estimate – Production/Deployment Phase

| WBS Element | Phase% | LCC% |
|--------------------|--------|-------|
| 2.1 PMP | 61.8% | 14.5% |
| 2.2 A/C Integr | 3.6% | 0.8% |
| 2.3 Grd Sys Imp | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| 2.4 ST&E | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| 2.5 SE/PM | 8.3% | 2.0% |
| 2.6 Supportability | 20.3% | 4.7% |
| 2.7 Data | 1.2% | 0.3% |
| 2.8 ECP | 1.9% | 0.4% |
| 2.9 OGC | 2.9% | 0.7% |
| Total | 100.0% | 23.4% |

- **85.7% of Production/Deployment \$ is for PMP, A/C Integration and Supportability** (shaded areas)
- **Prime Mission Product (PMP)**
 - Detailed T_1 (Labor/Mat'l) and Learning Curve across Each LRU
- **Aircraft (A/C) Integration**
 - Assumed no Learning for Modification/Install Labor based on numerous organizations performing them across time
- **Supportability**
 - Manufacturing Rate Assessment: Special Tooling/Prod Rate SE/Repair Station SE
 - Annual Quantity drives demand

Strongest Influences or Highest Risk

- **PMP – Assumed learning curve**
- **A/C Integration & Supportability – System deployment qty/rate**

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LCC Estimate – Operations & Support Phase

| WBS Element | Phase% | LCC% |
|------------------|--------|-------|
| 3.1 Mission Per | 3.2% | 2.4% |
| 3.2 UL Consmpt | 56.1% | 41.4% |
| 3.3 I/M Maint | 16.1% | 11.9% |
| 3.4 Depot Maint | 8.9% | 6.6% |
| 3.5 Ktr Support | 3.5% | 2.6% |
| 3.6 Sustain Spt | 8.8% | 6.5% |
| 3.7 Indirect Spt | 1.4% | 1.0% |
| 3.8 ECP | 0.5% | 0.4% |
| 3.9 OGC | 1.5% | 1.1% |
| Total | 100.0% | 73.9% |

- 81.1% of Total O&S \$ is for Unit Level Consumption, Inter. Maint. and Depot Maint. (shaded areas)
- Unit Level (UL) Consumption
 - CM System induced Weight/Drag Impacts on Fuel Use across Aircraft Types (done for every discrete aircraft type) *Ex of how risk/uncertainty reduced*
- Intermediate Maintenance (I/M)
 - Unscheduled Repairs—due to MFHBF/year across each LRU—times \$/Repair
- Depot Maintenance
 - Periodic CM System Tech Refresh

Strongest Influences or Highest Risk

- **Unit Level Consumption – Assumed fuel cost, induced drag**
- **Maintenance – System reliability**

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LCC Estimate – De-Mod/Disposal Phase

| WBS Element | Phase% | LCC% |
|--------------|--------|------|
| 4.1 De-Mod | 72.2% | 0.8% |
| 4.2 Disposal | 27.8% | 0.3% |
| Total | 100.0% | 1.1% |

- De-Modification
 - Final removal of the Aircraft Modifications (e.g., A-kit)
 - 100% of original install time
 - Final removal of CM Equipment (e.g., B-kit)
 - 50% of original install time
- Disposal
 - All disposal costs of A-kit and B-kit material

Strongest Influences or Highest Risk

- **De-Modification – % of labor effort from original installation**

LCC Estimate – Sensitivities

| Attribute | + / - % | Low | LCC | High |
|------------------------------------|---------|-------|-------|-------|
| \$/STC (New/Amend) | 20 | 0.998 | 1.000 | 1.002 |
| CM System T ₁ | 15 | 0.952 | 1.000 | 1.048 |
| CM System Learning Curve | 5 | 0.852 | 1.000 | 1.255 |
| Fuel (\$/gal) | 25 | 0.903 | 1.000 | 1.097 |
| Fleet Drag (%) | 20 | 0.941 | 1.000 | 1.059 |
| Installed Weight (lbs) | 10 | 0.991 | 1.000 | 1.009 |
| Initial Reliability (MFHBF, WB/NB) | 25 | 0.970 | 1.000 | 1.050 |
| Order Quantity | 5 | 0.958 | 1.000 | 1.040 |

- Costs normalized to ‘Base Case’
- Sensitivities are shown as being independent of each other
 - Correlations could result in significantly different impacts (e.g., an increase in fuel cost coupled with higher than projected drag effects)

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Risk Insights

- Highest Estimating Risk
 - System Deployment Quantity and Rate
 - Fuel Cost
 - System Reliability
 - Learning Curves
- ‘Red Herrings’
 - NRE Cost for Each Aircraft Type
 - Technology Refresh Costs
 - Installation Weight (unless talking Regional Jets)
 - First Unit Cost (e.g., T_1)

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Related Activities

- Deployment decision influenced by probability of threat and applicable cost/benefit analyses
- USC CREATE has done groundbreaking work on the economic impacts of a MANPADS attack
 - Avoiding the economic impact is a benefit
- Ongoing threat assessments are crucial to evaluating the likelihood of a MANPADS attack
- Metrics for quantifying the level of protection afforded by a given deployment alternative
 - More than just number of planes, number of flights, and/or number of passengers

Questions?

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Presenter Biographies

- Mr. Kirk L. Hoy
 - Sr. Principal Summit Engineering Group
 - Certified Cost Estimator/Cost Analyst (SCEA)
 - BS/BA Industrial Engineering/Economics (Lehigh University)
 - MS Systems Engineering (Virginia Tech)
 - 23+ years of systems engineering and cost estimation/analysis experience
- Mr. Kurt Willstatter
 - Sr. Principal Summit Engineering Group
 - Certified Cost Estimator/Cost Analyst (SCEA)
 - BA Biology (Texas A&M)
 - MS Operations Research (Naval Post Graduate School)
 - 15+ years of systems engineering, modeling & simulation, cost estimation experience
 - 20 years of Navy operations and systems engineering

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